The passing of Alan Greenspan at 100 closes the book on an era when the Federal Reserve’s monetary experiments began reshaping the economic landscape that gun owners navigate every day. Greenspan’s long stewardship of easy-credit policies and his famous 1990s admission that markets could self-regulate helped inflate asset bubbles whose inevitable bursts sent waves of inflation and volatility through the very commodities—steel, brass, powder, and polymer—that determine the price and availability of firearms and ammunition. For the 2A community, his legacy is a cautionary tale: when central banks treat money as infinitely elastic, the real cost of defending one’s rights can spike overnight, turning routine range trips into budgeting exercises and panic-buying events into political flashpoints.

Beyond the price charts, Greenspan’s intellectual footprint still influences the regulatory climate surrounding firearms. His repeated emphasis on systemic-risk modeling encouraged an alphabet-soup of federal agencies to adopt similarly technocratic approaches when they later scrutinized “ghost guns,” braced pistols, and ammunition imports. The same mindset that once green-lit complex derivatives now underpins ever-more-intricate ATF rulemakings that redefine everyday components as regulated items. Pro-2A advocates therefore have a vested interest in understanding how unelected monetary authorities and administrative agencies feed off one another; both operate with minimal electoral accountability and both can constrict individual liberty without ever passing a single law through Congress.

Looking ahead, Greenspan’s death is less an obituary than a reminder that the fight for the right to keep and bear arms is inseparable from the battle over sound money and limited government. As the nation debates fresh rounds of spending and potential CBDC pilots, gun owners should recognize that currency debasement and regulatory creep are two sides of the same coin—one inflates the cost of arms, the other narrows the legal space in which they can be acquired and carried. The most durable defense of the Second Amendment may ultimately require the same skepticism toward concentrated power that Greenspan once preached but rarely practiced at the Fed.